In other words, given what I know, which I feel is very little, I can't fault the plan. Further, at each phase of the war as things went both wrong and right, I never felt that I could second guess it after the fact. I'm not the president. Not the defense secretary, not a general... I don't know what they know/knew. I don't know how faulty or solid their applied logic was as they made decisions.

I sure as hell am not going to second guess the plan or planners based upon articles by truthout.org. I'm about as attentive to liberal propaganda as I am to conservative propaganda. I'm not questioning what Rumsfeld is quoted as demanding that Iraqi invasion plans only be drawn for a short-duration war. He most likely did. I'm asking what the pretext was at the time? Could any rational, sensible person have been able to see that the war would metastasize from conventional combat into counteri-insurgency? I'm not defending him. I'm only trying to synthesize information in order to see if I can make a fair (or any) conclusion. Name a any leader and I'd bet that they've made errors in judgement at on point or time.

What does the collapse of a 90-day wonder Iraqi brigade have to do with anything? Have you ever tried to organize, equip, and train 5000-odd men into a viable and capable fighting force? ...even in 5 years time? Has every Iraqi brigade we've formed failed in the same manner? Why did they collapse? Is the mission in Falluja unwinnable without this brigade? Are we forming another?

Look. I stated that I've never cared for Rumsfeld. If you were to ask me if his major mistakes were in the 10s or the 100s, I'd tell you I don't know but my gut tells me they were probably nearer to the 100s.

I'm just that I think his worst error has been how he stiff-arms the American public and doesn't excercise even half disclosure to ensure that we know as much is as feasible for us to know about the global war on terrorism. Since he hasn't done that, I have only limited means of assessing the plan nor the leaders. As a matter of fact, I do have a little bit more insight than the general public does with regards to the Army's plan and how the Army's leaders are doing....but still not much more.

 

simple fact of the matter (as echoed by some ex service folk i work with) is this.

Civilian leadership is critical, but civilian leadership that doesnt allow the military leadership to do its damn job (and doesnt listen to its suggestions) is faulty and will lead us astray.

 

You sound just like Rummy, himself! :P

This was the last of Saddam's former army; unwilling to aide American Troops. I posted this in reference to problems our army had experienced upon entering Iraq. The original army was disbanded; the one in which was projected to meet the 300,000 troop requirement stated in the First year of "Operation Iraqi Freedom." Banned from government jobs in the future; there must have been more than a few pissed off Iraqi's. What steps were taken to disarm these former Iraqi Guards?! Plan A backfired. Big deal, right? Hah. Now they're fighing ever-growing Iraqi insurgents; with far less army personnel. The wits, technology, and training our guy's are using is the only thing giving us a striving chance. The deficit wont hold forever. Could be compared to the Levee's I suppose. You know where.

"Missing from the Defense Department's inventory books were 13,180 semiautomatic pistols, 751 assault rifles and 99 machine guns, according to an audit requested by Sen. John Warner"
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061029/...ruction_audits
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6815732

I think that any rational, sensible person would agree with you on this.

Who doesn't make mistakes? Chuck Norris, thats who.

 

Please don't compare me to Mr Personality of a Brick.

1. I feel that the secretary has kept us much more in the dark than I think is proper.
2. Because we're in the dark, I don't think we can make a fair assessment.
3. 1 brigade, 3 brigades, 15...were never hoped to turn into supertroops. The success or failure of operations was never hinged upon the Iraqi army becoming good. The hopes were high, but each brigade that fails is a minor setback; though unfortunately, easy for pundits and anti-war congressmen to seize upon. And I concede that if we were able to make them into a viable security/military force, it would have panned out very nicely for the administration.
4. Chuck would've had this handled in less than 24hrs.

 

Apologies.

I concur!