I didn't say that. But how many others are on that commision? She isn't the end all. It's a commision. Is it your assertion that the entire commision is slanted?

 

It is slanted, at first they denied they even heard of Able Danger, they the admitted to hearing about, and chose to ignore it because it didn't fit what they wanted to say.

 

I don't remember them denying that they had heard of Able Danger. They said they had heard of a project like that but that it had never mentioned Atta's name or his cell. It really boils down to who you believe.

Do I think that Gorelick should be on the commision when she wrote that memo? Nope. But I would tend to believe some of the commisioners on the panel over a maverick sensationalist representitive that has a book coming out and is looking to land the Chair of the HASC position. But that's just me.

 

"The meeting, on July 12, 2004, has not been previously disclosed. That it occurred, and that the officer identified Mr. Atta there, were acknowledged by officials of the commission after the congressman, Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania, provided information about it."

That's from the NY Times. In an article called 9/11 Commission's Staff Rejected Report on Early Identification of Chief Hijacker,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/11/po...gewanted=print

Commission co-chairman Lee Hamilton’s statement from yesterday:
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,165268,00.html
The Sept. 11 commission (search) did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohammed Atta or of his cell,“ said Hamilton, a former Democratic congressman from Indiana. “Had we learned of it obviously it would’ve been a major focus of our investigation.”

I'd say that's denial

 

What we know:

* In 1999, the Pentagon established an intelligence unit called Able Danger, assigned to seek out and identify al-Qaeda cells and members for U.S. Special Operations Command. This group reportedly used data mining from open sources.

* Approximately August or September 2000, Able Danger identified an al-Qaeda cell in Brooklyn. An intelligence official and Rep. Curt Weldon claim that the AD unit identified Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, and included a photo of Atta. (Weldon claims that he has spoken to four persons involved with the program.) At least two of those men were pilots on the hijacked flights.

* Able Danger analysts recommended the information be passed on to the FBI so that the cell could be rounded up. Accounts in Government Security News, the New York Times, and the Associated Press indicate that Pentagon lawyers decided that anyone holding a green card (as it was believed the cell members did) had to be granted essentially the same legal protections as any U.S. citizen. Thus, the information Able Danger had gathered could not be shared with the FBI, the lawyers concluded. This is in keeping with “the wall” philosophy and policy established in 1995 by Assistant Attorney General Jamie Gorelick, in which intelligence and law enforcement were directed to go beyond what the law requires to keep intelligence-gathering and criminal law enforcement separated.

* The prohibition against sharing intelligence on Atta and the others should not have applied since they were in the country on visas. They did not have permanent resident status.

* At least two 9/11 Commission staffers were told of Able Danger’s findings on at least two occasions by members of the military intelligence community.

* Information about Able Danger was not passed on to the commissioners Tom Kean, Lee Hamilton, Tim Roemer, or John Lehman. If the other members of the commission have indicated whether or not they were informed of this information, I have not seen those reports.

* The 9/11 Commission Report, which everyone and their brother praised as a comprehensive and definitive analysis of the flaws in U.S. counterterrorism operations before 9/11, now has at least one giant glaring hole in it. One cannot help but wonder what else got left out, because some staffer or staffers seemed to think it wasn’t important enough. I relish the wording in this comment: “The 9-11 Commission’s job was to find and connect all the intelligence dots that obviously didn't get connected prior to 9-11, and then recommend how we can connect the dots better and faster next time. It wasn’t part of their job to erase the dots they didn’t like, before connecting. Doing that, implies that their conclusions were arrived at well before the investigation was complete.”


So if commision underlings prevented the info from getting to the commision members then I guess that is not denial. So in that sense you are correct.

 

Yes, that's denial of some sort. But what's sad is that we are discussing the actions of an exploratory commision that was supposed to look into 9/11 instead of going to the people who had that info about Atta and whoever decided it wasn't important enough to pass along. The diversion of attention is sickening...I don't give a flying f*** about who said she said said to whom from who. I care about some dumb a$$ knowing something very important (that concerns our security at home in America) and putting it on the back burner because he can't perform his job correctly.

 

What we don’t know:

* Just how many names Able Danger wanted to forward to the FBI. However, the wording in the Government Security article indicates that these four names were the only four that popped up on AD’s data-mining operation.

Thus, the information Able Danger had amassed about the only terrorist cell they had located inside the United States could not be shared with the FBI, the lawyers concluded.
Unless the former intelligence officer quoted in the story is lying, these four guys were all that Able Danger found.

* Whether the military lawyer who denied Able Danger’s request to pass on the information checked with any superiors.

* It seems very hard to imagine this information would not be passed on to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, and the White House’s point man on counterterrorism, Richard Clarke. Yet, as of this moment, we have no direct confirmation that this information went any higher than the Pentagon lawyer.

What is speculation, but is interesting speculation:

* The 9/11 Commission staffers who felt the information about Able Danger wasn’t worth mentioning to their bosses could, conceivably, be imbeciles. Perhaps, more plausible, is that they had a particular view they wished the report to express, and the Able Danger revelations contradicted that view. Another possibility: These staffers in question didn’t tell Kean, Hamilton, Roemer, or Lehman, but they did tell another member or other members of the Commission, who instructed them to leave it out of the briefings, summaries, and reports given to Kean, Hamilton, Roemer, Lehman, and/or other members. (COUGHgorelickCOUGH)

* No one has concretely tied this new information to the strange, felonious behavior of Sandy Berger, smuggling documents out of the National Archives. But boy, if the document in question related to Able Danger’s warning and the decision to not act upon it, his actions would make a lot more sense, wouldn’t they?

 

what is funny is that you guys are surprised by this..


1999.. haha i laugh in the face of that.. haha



and this is what happens when politics clashes with the intel community.. (turf wars)