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07-13-2004, 01:25 AM
The depth of the CIA's distortions over WMDs has been revealed, Marian Wilkinson writes.
The day before the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, delivered his critical speech to the United Nations saying Iraq possessed mobile biological weapons laboratories, a US intelligence agent warned the CIA that the evidence had come from an Iraqi defector called Curve Ball who was unreliable and possibly an alcoholic.
Despite that warning, the CIA did not change Powell's speech, which was designed to persuade the UN Security Council to vote in favour of the invasion of Iraq in February last year. The CIA Iraq officer who received the warning placated his colleague in an email before Powell spoke.
"Let's keep in mind, the war's going to happen regardless of what Curve Ball said or didn't say and the Powers That Be probably aren't interested in whether Curve Ball knows what he's talking about. However, in the interest of Truth, we owe somebody a sentence or two of warning, if you honestly have reservations," he wrote.
Powell's speech went ahead with the false information from Curve Ball that Iraq had developed mobile biological weapons laboratories.
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Powell told the Security Council: "One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq's biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents. Let me take you inside that intelligence file and share with you what we know from eyewitness accounts. We have first-hand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails".
The supposed eyewitness accounts came largely from Curve Ball, whom no one in the CIA had met. But the US Defence Intelligence Agency officer detailed to quiz Curve Ball, and who met him once in the custody of a foreign intelligence agency, was sceptical. He wrote to the CIA desk officer in an email that Curve Ball had "a terrible hangover" the morning they met, and the agent thought he was an alcoholic. The email said the agency's operatives in Iraq "were attempting to determine if, in fact, Curve Ball was who he said he was".
The defence intelligence officer continued: "These issues, in my opinion, warrant further inquiry, before we use the information as the backbone of one of our major findings of the existence of a continuing Iraqi BW [biological weapons] program."
The officer pointed out in his email, written the day before Powell's speech, that the other witnesses cited in the draft of the speech were problematic as well. One of the sources was an Iraqi major, the officer wrote.
"This is the Vanity Fair source - who was deemed a fabricator. Need I say more?"
But his colleague at the CIA would not be budged by the concerns. Powell's speech was going to be delivered the next day and the CIA officer thought it was "too far along to bring them up". The email exchange between the CIA's deputy director of its Iraq desk and the defence intelligence officer who handled Curve Ball is just one of scores of devastating revelations in the report of the US Senate committee examining the prewar intelligence on Iraq.
Read as a whole, the 500-page report is a scathing indictment of the Western intelligence services' assessment of the threat from Saddam Hussein. But it is especially damning of the CIA, whose officers and their superiors distorted the intelligence on Iraq.
The two senators who led the inquiry, Pat Roberts, a Republican, and Jay Rockefeller, a Democrat, called the prewar claims, "a global intelligence failure".
Roberts said: "Before the war, the US intelligence community told the President, as well as the Congress and the public, that Saddam Hussein had stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and, if left unchecked, would probably have a nuclear weapon during this decade.
"Well, today we know these assessments were wrong. They were also unreasonable and largely unsupported by the available intelligence."
Rockefeller was blunter: "There is simply no question that mistakes leading up to the war in Iraq rank among the most devastating losses and intelligence failures in the history of the nation.
"The fact is that the Administration, at all levels, and to some extent us, used bad information to bolster its case for war."
And Congress "would not have authorised that war with 75 votes if we knew what we know now".
The Prime Minister, John Howard, relied on this same wrong intelligence when he went into Parliament last year to justify the invasion of Iraq and the commitment of Australian troops.
He told Parliament: "We cannot walk away from the threat that Iraq's continued possession of weapons of mass destruction constitutes to its region and to the wider world. In the final analysis, the absolute conviction of the Government is that disarming Iraq is necessary for the long-term security of the world and is therefore manifestly in the national interest of Australia."
The day before the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, delivered his critical speech to the United Nations saying Iraq possessed mobile biological weapons laboratories, a US intelligence agent warned the CIA that the evidence had come from an Iraqi defector called Curve Ball who was unreliable and possibly an alcoholic.
Despite that warning, the CIA did not change Powell's speech, which was designed to persuade the UN Security Council to vote in favour of the invasion of Iraq in February last year. The CIA Iraq officer who received the warning placated his colleague in an email before Powell spoke.
"Let's keep in mind, the war's going to happen regardless of what Curve Ball said or didn't say and the Powers That Be probably aren't interested in whether Curve Ball knows what he's talking about. However, in the interest of Truth, we owe somebody a sentence or two of warning, if you honestly have reservations," he wrote.
Powell's speech went ahead with the false information from Curve Ball that Iraq had developed mobile biological weapons laboratories.
Advertisement Advertisement
Powell told the Security Council: "One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq's biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents. Let me take you inside that intelligence file and share with you what we know from eyewitness accounts. We have first-hand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails".
The supposed eyewitness accounts came largely from Curve Ball, whom no one in the CIA had met. But the US Defence Intelligence Agency officer detailed to quiz Curve Ball, and who met him once in the custody of a foreign intelligence agency, was sceptical. He wrote to the CIA desk officer in an email that Curve Ball had "a terrible hangover" the morning they met, and the agent thought he was an alcoholic. The email said the agency's operatives in Iraq "were attempting to determine if, in fact, Curve Ball was who he said he was".
The defence intelligence officer continued: "These issues, in my opinion, warrant further inquiry, before we use the information as the backbone of one of our major findings of the existence of a continuing Iraqi BW [biological weapons] program."
The officer pointed out in his email, written the day before Powell's speech, that the other witnesses cited in the draft of the speech were problematic as well. One of the sources was an Iraqi major, the officer wrote.
"This is the Vanity Fair source - who was deemed a fabricator. Need I say more?"
But his colleague at the CIA would not be budged by the concerns. Powell's speech was going to be delivered the next day and the CIA officer thought it was "too far along to bring them up". The email exchange between the CIA's deputy director of its Iraq desk and the defence intelligence officer who handled Curve Ball is just one of scores of devastating revelations in the report of the US Senate committee examining the prewar intelligence on Iraq.
Read as a whole, the 500-page report is a scathing indictment of the Western intelligence services' assessment of the threat from Saddam Hussein. But it is especially damning of the CIA, whose officers and their superiors distorted the intelligence on Iraq.
The two senators who led the inquiry, Pat Roberts, a Republican, and Jay Rockefeller, a Democrat, called the prewar claims, "a global intelligence failure".
Roberts said: "Before the war, the US intelligence community told the President, as well as the Congress and the public, that Saddam Hussein had stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and, if left unchecked, would probably have a nuclear weapon during this decade.
"Well, today we know these assessments were wrong. They were also unreasonable and largely unsupported by the available intelligence."
Rockefeller was blunter: "There is simply no question that mistakes leading up to the war in Iraq rank among the most devastating losses and intelligence failures in the history of the nation.
"The fact is that the Administration, at all levels, and to some extent us, used bad information to bolster its case for war."
And Congress "would not have authorised that war with 75 votes if we knew what we know now".
The Prime Minister, John Howard, relied on this same wrong intelligence when he went into Parliament last year to justify the invasion of Iraq and the commitment of Australian troops.
He told Parliament: "We cannot walk away from the threat that Iraq's continued possession of weapons of mass destruction constitutes to its region and to the wider world. In the final analysis, the absolute conviction of the Government is that disarming Iraq is necessary for the long-term security of the world and is therefore manifestly in the national interest of Australia."